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Introduction
The disastrous results of World War II and the breakdown of the communist re-
gime were two historical global events that forced international statesmen firstly 
to install in 1947 and secondly to improve in 1995 the structures of the world 
trade system and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The question is whether 
we lack such historical events in the present time to solve the current problems 
of the Doha Round negotiations in order to improve the WTO system, or are there 
other reasons impelling us to talk about the crisis of the WTO?
The following article begins with a short overview of world trade after World 
War II until the Uruguay Round and from there to the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA). After that I will discuss the current situation of the state of play of the 
negotiations, and will follow this with an analysis of difficulties of the present 
WTO system. Finally I will come to the conclusion: The crisis of the WTO results 
in the lack of commitment on the part of politicians.
The organisation of world trade after  
World War II until the Uruguay Round
After World War II international statesmen agreed to secure global peace not just 
through the democratisation of the defeated, formerly fascist or dictator-ruled 
countries but also by introducing structures to guarantee rule of law and market 
economy. This would help create long term employment and prosperity, which 
in turn would further stabilise the peace process. It soon became apparent that 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom within countries required a corresponding 
international framework so as to finally close the chapter on the disastrous con-
sequences of past trade wars and the associated periods of economic depression 
in the post war period. This necessitated not just the creation of an international 
peace order but also of a multilateral trading system.
In 1947 about 20 trade ministers from western countries met at a first world 
trade conference intending to make a start at progressively dismantling the tra-
de barriers for goods built up in the aftermath of World War II. As a result the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged. It was decided that this 
agreement on goods and tariffs would be reviewed and improved upon at regular 
intervals at world trade rounds in order to achieve, for example, further reduc-
tions in duties or the like.
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This laid the foundations for the unparalleled reconstruction of the destroyed 
economies in Europe and Asia. It also marked the beginning of a steady growth in 
world trade, which was responsible for the economic miracle in exporting coun-
tries like Germany, Japan or Taiwan. There was acknowledgement of the fact that 
successful trade under observance of fair rules leads to more orders for companies, 
inflation-free growth and creates incentives for quality, technical innovation, new 
products and services as well as greater competitiveness. This process benefits all – 
consumers and producers, employers and employees.
After 30 years of regular GATT rounds it was felt that the rapid growth and 
expansion of world trade required a larger framework than merely agreements 
on tariffs. At a meeting of trade ministers – now numbering over 100 – in Punta 
del Este (Uruguay) in 1986 it was agreed that new trade negotiations would be 
held. The hopes pinned on the improvement of the trade regime, which involved 
the most comprehensive and complex negotiations in history, were so high that, 
by the end of the Uruguay Round, which was formally concluded in Marrakech 
(Morocco) in April 1994, over 125 countries became signatories to the agreement 
on a new World Trade Organization (WTO).
After a furious start the negotiations stopped for over one year but were re-
kindled by the fall of the iron wall in 1990, which previously had divided the world 
in two political and economic blocks. At that time the developing countries and the 
former centrally planned economies, which were in a phase of transition from a 
state-administered to a market economy, were also undertaking large scale reform, 
deregulation and liberalisation programmes. They recognised how valuable it was 
to belong to a club of countries that observed fair but strict and reliable rules and 
a system that limited the power of the big countries (one country, one vote) and 
protected the smaller and developing countries. Just like nuclear weapons were 
being phased out during the same period, the new World Trade Organisation and 
its dispute settlement body (DSU) were expected to reduce the number of trade 
wars, rein in protectionism and put an end to retaliatory measures.
The implementation of the WTO in Geneva, the most significant development 
of the Uruguay Round, marked the creation of a permanent forum with a perma-
nent structure for the changed GATT system. Simultaneously, international trade in 
services was included in the multilateral process for world trade liberalisation for 
the first time through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Finally, 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
was established for protecting patents internationally and to better combat co-
pying. This covered practically all aspects of world trade at that time. Countries 
	 The	Crisis	of	the	WTO	 
such as China and Russia have since been attempting to become members of WTO. 
China was accepted in 2001 and globalisation received an additional push. Russia 
is still on the way to get acceptance.
From the Uruguay Round to the 
Doha Development Agenda
Integration in the world economy and international competitiveness cannot be 
achieved by protectionism but rather by opening up markets. This in turn requires 
painful structural adjustments which drastically affect the living conditions of 
people.
For developing and emerging countries the efforts required are enormous, 
possibly exceeding their capacities. All of a sudden, the issue becomes not just 
world trade but also development policy and other basic factors such as good 
governance – allowing the private sector to develop alongside the state. There 
are social issues like labour, education and training for men and women as well 
as environmental aspects like energy, natural resource scarcity or climate chan-
ge. The inclusion of these issues in world trade has been rejected by the majority 
of the developing countries as an interference in their internal matters and as a 
form of hidden protectionism.
At the ministerial conferences taking place every two years after the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round conflicts broke out among the rich industrialised nations 
on the one side and the emerging economies as well as the poorest of the poor, 
the developing countries, on the other. This led to the failure of the liberalisati-
on negotiations in Seattle (USA) 1999. The conference was abandoned without 
arriving at any outcome. Against the backdrop of experiences with the Uruguay 
Round it was agreed at the ministerial conference in Doha (Qatar) in 2001 that 
not only would the world trade system be further liberalised, but also that special 
assistance would be provided to the developing and emerging countries during 
the adjustment process to facilitate their integration in world trade. The Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) was born.
A worldwide discussion regarding a millennium conference began and inspi-
red many politicians to work for solutions for these countries which seemed to 
be the losers of globalisation. These solutions were meant to let them participate 
in the benefits of international trade. Compared with the beforehand cited hi-
storical events of World War II and the fall of the iron curtain – as a motivator 
for improvement of the WTO – the turn of the millennium was of course a much 
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weaker impetus. To include all aspects of trade in this development agenda it was 
decided to create pressure on the negotiators to achieve results. There would be 
parallel negotiations across the board and the outcomes would all be signed si-
multaneously (single undertaking).
What were the negotiation objectives?
– Dismantling of trade distorting agricultural subsidies and the opening up of 
agricultural markets for developing countries. The United States and the EU 
provide the heaviest subsidies and need to make the maximum concessions.
– Further reduction of duties on goods and enhanced market access for non-ag-
ricultural products (NAMA). Here it is the emerging and developing economies 
that are finding it difficult and hindering the necessary south-south trade. The 
EU has offered to totally eliminate duties for developing countries. 
– Opening up of the services market in member states, removal of barriers to 
cross-border trade in services and in the movement of personnel, lifting of 
restrictions on business activities. An open market for services offers immense 
advantages not just for the industrialised countries but also for the developing 
countries.
– Improvement in rules for trade defence instruments (TDI), such as the Anti 
Dumping Agreement and the elimination of subsidies; creation of transparency 
with regard to a majority of instruments.
– Creation of trade facilitation measures by dismantling bureaucracy in customs 
procedures.
– TRIPS flexibility for public health and access to medicines, biological diversity 
and geographical indications.
– Reform of the dispute settlement mechanism
Apart from these liberalisation measures a development dimension will also 
be incorporated with the intent of benefiting the least developed countries and 
enabling them to successfully participate in world trade. This includes programmes 
such as:
– Special and Differential treatment (S+D) for developing countries, e.g. through 
duty free and quota free (DFQF) market access for all products from these 
countries.
–  Expansion of the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund (DDAGTF) 
beyond the regular WTO budgets for technical support for the countries.
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– Strengthening of trade-related development cooperation (Aid for Trade, AfT) 
by supporting trade-relevant supply infrastructure in developing countries.
These negotiation objectives in fact represent a reduced list which was final-
ly agreed in July 2004 by dropping controversial issues („Singapore issues“) after 
resistance from the developing countries at the failed first ministerial conference 
in Cancun (Mexico) in 2003. However, even these objectives, according to many 
experts, are far more ambitious than the Uruguay Round in their liberalisation 
targets and developmental guidelines for the developing countries. Studies have 
shown that a successful conclusion of this round can generate additional income 
of up to USD 600 billion worldwide if just a third of the existing trade barriers are 
dismantled. It would consequently be heartbreaking for all countries involved in 
world trade if the outcomes of the WTO Round that are within grasping distance 
continue to remain elusive.
Snapshot: Is the end of the game finally in sight?
For a current snapshot of the WTO negotiations in the course of the DDA, sub-
sequently referred to as the Doha round, at the end of 2007 one really needs to 
rewind to 2006, or more precisely 26 July 2006, which marked at least the tem-
porary end of the WTO negotiations. 
It was on this day that WTO Director General Pascal Lamy recommended to the 
WTO General Council that negotiations shall be suspended indefinitely as he saw 
no possibility of forging the required compromise between the diverse interests 
of the member countries. It appeared that the goal of successfully concluding the 
negotiations that were initiated in Doha, Qatar, in 2001 by the end of 2006 was 
no longer achievable in view of various deadlocks. Moreover, the US Trade Promo-
tion Authority (TPA), which grants the American president the right to participate 
in and conclude negotiations, was to expire by the end of July 2007. Thus, even 
if wildly optimistic scenarios of arriving at a settlement were feasible, it seemed 
that no sufficient time would be left to ratify the outcomes. The world trade round 
appeared since then in serious danger of collapsing. There has been an impasse 
in the negotiations in Geneva ever since. But the history of the Uruguay Round 
shows that suspension of negotiations was not unusual.
Massive protests followed. International trade councils such as the Internati-
onal Service Coalition (ISC) or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and 
European business associations such as BUSINESSEUROPE (formerly UNICE), the 
European Services Forum (ESF) or national umbrella organisations like the BDI 
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(Federation of German Industries) raised a storm and demanded resumption of 
the negotiations in the interests of world trade. Across the world, prominent fi-
gures from the scientific and business communities and society at large joined in 
the chorus of protest and warned against the negative consequences for global 
growth and prosperity. CEOs of many European companies, e.g. TUI AG, lent their 
voice to the protests. Lamy, too, embarked on a persuasion campaign, travelling 
among others to the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), where he persistently advocated the resumption of 
negotiations in the interests of the developing countries. Fortunately, these ef-
forts paid off.
On 7 February 2007 Lamy confirmed the official resumption of negotiations 
to the WTO General Council. Prior to this about 30 trade ministers had partici-
pated in a ministerial meeting on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in 
Davos on January 27 where they declared their readiness to resume substantive 
negotiations.
At the same time, the need to achieve parallel progress in all areas of negot-
iations was highlighted. Apart from the contentious negotiations on agriculture, 
especially between the EU and USA, even industrial goods, services, trade facili-
tation and trade rules needed to move ahead. Lastly, the actual objective, i.e. the 
development dimension of the Doha Round in terms of opening world trade parti-
cularly for developing countries was emphasised. By mid February the shape that 
the negotiations would take began to emerge. Initially the major WTO partners 
would attempt to find a breakthrough during informal discussions, the results of 
which would then be transmitted to a transparent multilateral negotiation pro-
cess involving all (currently 151) WTO members.
Substantial breakthroughs of this nature would require new offers to be made 
by the negotiation partners. Since March and April, therefore, G4 (EU, USA, Brazil, 
India) and since the end of June G6 (+ Australia, Japan) discussions have been ta-
king place. Parallel to this, meetings of the negotiators were resumed in Geneva. 
„Fireside chats“ with selected group delegations are being cautiously taken up 
in addition to „transparency rounds“ to discuss the modalities for resumption of 
substantive negotiations. But everything really depends on the big players who 
were ultimately responsible for the failure of the negotiations in 2006. Initially, 
the agreement of the G4 on at least a part of the modalities (partial convergence) 
was targeted for end April 2007. A meeting of the G6 in New Delhi from April 10-
12 resulted in the G4/G6 resolving to intensify their negotiations in the coming 
weeks with the objective of concluding the Doha Round by the end of 2007. 
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But suddenly just before the summer break in 2007 ministerial meetings of 
the G4 and G6 collapsed again notably in June in Potsdam and in July in Geneva. 
Pascal Lamy, Director-General to the WTO, saw the process in great danger. This 
breakdown meant that the negotiations trying to achieve modalities by bilateral 
or pluri-lateral talks like G4, G6 or G20, in groups or rounds like the Friends of 
Services had come to an end.
In this situation multilateral working recommenced and the Chair of the Com-
mittee of Agriculture, Ambassador Falconer and the Chair of the negotiation Group 
on Market access, Ambassador Stephenson presented new draft modalities, which 
signified a breakthrough and reopened the ways for multilateral talks. Lamy sum-
marized the situation with the words: “The hour of truth is rapidly approaching. 
We are moving incrementally in the right direction, albeit three years later than 
we should have. The round is now not only technically possible but also a political 
must. The question is, whether there will be a text for services and the other to-
pics, which can be presented and whether it is possible to bring all the elements 
of the round together as it is to be done under the single undertaking.”
Why are the Doha Round talks at risk?
There are a lot of reasons why the DDA process could fail. As it is very easy to find 
out, the great denominator is that the WTO members are not willing to commit 
themselves. Everybody is finger pointing, expecting the other to go first, which is 
shown by the following examples. 
First: There is no real deal between NAMA and agriculture. The developing 
and emerging countries have opened their markets for NAMA already by the uni-
lateral dismantling of trade barriers and lowering tariffs and duties within the 
official structures of the WTO regime. But in the DDA process the WTO members 
only offer to cut their legal ceilings but not the much lower duties they actually 
apply. That means there is no real offer to the other members. Especially India, 
Brazil and South Africa are the leading Third World nations in this context. On the 
other hand the EU and the US are under pressure to cut farm subsidies as part of 
the deal, but they don’t want to disarm unilaterally.
Second: Developing countries want to receive something in return for reducing 
tariffs or consolidation of tariff rates. The return can be not alone in the agricu-
ltural sector but also in the service sector. They aim to sell their concessions for 
the highest price possible. But unfortunately the service negotiations came to an 
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end in June 2006. So they behave like people who say: Take part in the negotia-
tions but don’t commit.
Third: The poorest developing countries enjoy tariff free market access to 
the EU and partially to the US as well following the motto “everything but arms”. 
Hence they have relatively little to gain in tariff negotiations. In particular, they 
have no economic interest in a general tariff reduction that would improve in 
relative terms market chances for more developed countries.
Fourth: In this context the interests of WTO members are not necessarily split 
along North-South lines. For example, if we take the EU offer for sugar market 
liberalisation, Mauritius had to accept substantial losses while on the other hand, 
Brazil is a winner.
Fifth: A process involving 151 countries and numerous negotiating topics 
is extremely complex and cumbersome. The conduct of the key actors G4 or G6 
is significant, yet they are not capable of steering the entire process.”It is like a 
Rubik`s Cube”, Lamy always is saying. The Rubik´s Cube has six colours, one on 
each side, which is further sub-divided into nine mini-squares. When the puzzle 
is solved, each face of the cube is one single colour. Completing the Doha Round 
is like solving a Rubik`s Cube – to get all colours to line-up, a particular sequen-
ce must be followed. One wrong turn and everything is in disarray. But there are 
three big differences: Firstly, in the Doha Round there are more than six colours 
to solve; secondly, there are 151 Rubik’s Cube masters in the WTO who often dis-
agree on the turns to make; and thirdly, we have a narrow window of opportunity 
to get the sequence right.
Sixth: The negotiation reality of the Doha Round is that agricultural subsidies, 
agricultural tariffs and industrial tariffs are the gateway issues to the rest of the 
Doha Round package. Without settling these one simply cannot progress to the 
final stage of the round. This does not mean that the services negotiations are not 
equally crucial, not least because until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed. 
But negotiations on trade in services are unlikely those on agriculture and 
industrial goods, as there are no tariffs in services and barriers are not easily 
quantifiable. One cannot, therefore, use general formulae of general percentage 
reductions. Services negotiation is a traditional bilateral request and offer ne-
gotiation. Each member decides what it wishes to request of its trading partners 
in the more than 30 services sectors. It also decides in which sectors it will offer 
new opening commitments and on how it wishes to respond to the requests it has 
decided upon. Even more specifically, members decide in which of the four modes 
	 The	Crisis	of	the	WTO	 1
of delivery they wish to undertake commitments: cross border supply or Mode 1; 
consumption abroad or Mode 2; commercial presence or Mode 3; and temporary 
entry of professionals or Mode 4. 
All this makes the services negotiations run on a different – if even parallel – 
track, with their own specificities. Until now, the industrial countries have kept 
the brakes on in their efforts to push forward the negotiations. Neither the US, nor 
the EU or Japan had really brought substantial new offers in the field of services 
by the end of July 2006, as was declared in Annex C of the Hongkong Ministerial 
Declaration (2005) due to the breakdown of negotiations.
Last but not least: Trade policy interests are divided in many national interests, 
especially in the USA and Japan but also in other countries. These countries are 
pinning their hopes on bilateral negotiations. Bilateral negotiations have in any 
case been on the rise given the stagnation of the WTO round from time to time 
and the slow progress made in resumption of negotiations. The EU had earlier an-
nounced a moratorium on new negotiations when the Doha Round commenced in 
2001. In an announcement in autumn 2006 the EU declared it was giving up this 
strategy. The EU is currently preparing for negotiations with India, South Korea, 
ASEAN and a number of Latin American countries. Important trade competitors 
of the EU such as Japan and the USA are also constantly expanding their network 
of bilateral agreements.
Yet, bilateral agreements are only a second best solution to WTO agreements 
according to representatives from the business world and academia. They are 
not a true substitute for multilateral liberalisation. In comparison, bilateral and 
regional agreements can only have a very limited impact. Moreover, a host of bi-
lateral regulations threatens to make the world trade system more complicated 
than it already is.
What is at stake? 
In the present situation one would be justified in asking whether Doha can still be 
salvaged. And if so, under what conditions, and what results can this be expected 
to achieve? Business federations such as the BDI have warned against trying to 
achieve an outcome at any cost. If, on the other hand, there is no outcome, what 
is at stake for world trade and e.g. for the developing countries?
A summary of what has been achieved so far, namely the Uruguay Round 
and the Doha objectives, which were intended to go beyond the outcomes of the 
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Uruguay Round, will facilitate understanding of the extent of the disaster that 
a failure of the Doha Round would cause. The WTO offers many advantages. The 
multilateral level is transparent. Trade distortions between individual countries 
are avoided through the most favoured nation principle. The single undertaking 
approach can help to achieve progress in liberalising trade in difficult or sensi-
tive areas such as agriculture because compromises need to be reached across all 
areas of negotiations.
The WTO order is the legal backbone of world trade. Its rules can be imple-
mented through a binding dispute settlement mechanism in which any member, 
however small, has the same rights. The WTO therefore provides an indispensable 
foundation and is the most important economic regulatory system for world tra-
de. If all the current 151 members of WTO were to liberalise simultaneously, the 
economic impact on growth and employment and the consequent rise in global 
prosperity would be huge. The development dimension of the Doha Round also 
promises an additional one-time opportunity to countries that were earlier the 
weaker members and losers in the world trade system. This is also a testament to 
the growing importance of the developing and emerging economies.
A failure of the negotiations would nullify all that has been previously achie-
ved. It would lead to a loss of confidence not just in the politicians and diplo-
mats involved in the negotiations but also damage the credibility and image of 
the WTO. It would probably also have a negative impact on adherence to WTO 
rules and dispute settlement, potentially leading to an erosion of the world trade 
system. Against this backdrop, there is too much at stake if the DDA fails. Trade 
policy makers therefore bear a tremendous responsibility. One can only hope that 
they live up to it.
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